Endogeneity problems in empirical analyses of antitrust and competition
Economic experts in mergers and other antitrust matters use a variety of tools to disentangle correlation from causation and often disagree on the appropriate...
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Ilton Soares is an associate principal in the Antitrust & Competition Economics Practice, where he works primarily on merger and litigation cases.
He holds a PhD in economics from Columbia University, where he specialized in industrial organization and econometrics. Dr. Soares has extensive experience with economic and econometric modeling in antitrust and litigation, including analysis of mergers, foreclosure, cartels, demand estimation, damage estimation, spatial competition, bargaining, and non-price competition.
Dr. Soares has examined the competitive effects of proposed mergers and allegations of anti-competitive behavior in antitrust litigation cases in a wide range of industries, including fuel, casinos, chemicals, consumer products, medical devices, hermetic compressors, multimedia rights, office supplies, telecommunications, and health care.
Dr. Soares has done academic research on mergers in markets with exclusive dealing contracts, entry models, spatial competition, and network formation. He presented his research at Harvard Business School, Cornell University, Columbia University, and Microsoft Research. Dr. Soares has lectured econometrics, microeconomics, game theory, and industrial organization at undergraduate and graduate levels and has refereed for the International Journal of Industrial Organization and Journal of Applied Econometrics.